Dissertation

Social Anatomy of Action: Toward a Responsibility-Based Conception of Agency

Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 1997

Katarzyna Paprzycka

e-mail: lp.ude.wu|akcyzrpapk#lp.ude.wu|akcyzrpapk

PRELIMINARY MATTER
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1
1. Action as a Unit of Conduct 1
2. Two Main Problems 5
3. A Preview 8

CHAPTER I.
IS EXPLANATORY INDIVIDUALISM CONCEPTUALLY NECESSARY? 13
1. Individualism vs. Nonindividualism about Action Explanations 14
2. Individualism, Nonindividualism and Evolution 24
3. Arguments for Explanatory Individualism 26
4. Normative Individualism 39

CHAPTER II.
THE CHALLENGE OF HART’S THEORY OF ACTION 50
1. Two Kinds of Action Theories 51
2. H.L.A. Hart’s Theory of Action 53
3. The Fundamental Problem: The Concept of Action is Prior to the Concept of Responsibility 57
4. Against Ascriptivism 60

CHAPTER III.
PRACTICAL RESPONSIBILITY I: NORMATIVE EXPECTATIONS 64
1. Normative vs. Descriptive (Predictive) Expectations 65
2. Normative Expectations 69
3. Fulfilling Normative Expectations: Actions and Performances 70
4. Moral vs. Practical Normative Expectations 73
5. ‘It is (would be) reasonable to expect of a that a perform an action of F-ing’ 74

CHAPTER IV.
PRACTICAL RESPONSIBILITY II: TWO CONCEPTS OF REASONABLENESS 79
1. Two Concepts of Reasonableness 80
2. Reasonableness as an External Standard 86
3. Reasonableness, Conflict and Contrary Expectations 89

CHAPTER V.
PRACTICAL RESPONSIBILITY III: REASONABLEA NORMATIVE EXPECTATIONS 94
1. When Are Normative Expectations Prima Facie ReasonableA? 94
2. Defeating Conditions 102
3. Some Objections 113
4. Defeating Defeating Conditions 118

CHAPTER VI.
ACTIONS, OMISSIONS, AND MERE HAPPENINGS 128
1. A Preview 128
2. What Has Been Done: Two Senses of the Question 131
3. What Has Been Done? 135
4. Actions and Mere Happenings 148
5. Wayward Causal Chains 158

CHAPTER VII.
SELECTIONAL FORCE OF REASONS 164
1. Davidson’s Challenge 166
2. Selectional Explanations 171
3. Reasons as Selectional Criteria 178
4. Explanatory Nonindividualism Again 203
5. Two Further Problems 214
6. Objections 221

CONCLUSION 229

Appendices
APPENDIX A. THE ASYMMETRY THESIS 233
APPENDIX B. ACTION AS A PERFORMANCE INTENTIONAL UNDER A DESCRIPTION 241

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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